Introduction
Non-reciprocal trade preferences have been long granted by developed countries to various developing countries. Early in the post-World War II history of the GATT system, the pattern of these preferences reflected past colonial trade ties. In 1968, the UN Committed for Trade and Developmen t (UNCTAD) recommended the creation of a 'Generalized System of Preferences' (GSP) under which industrialized countries would grant trade preferences to all developing countries on a non-reciprocal basis. While UNCTAD has addressed a wider spectrum of issues in international economic relations, in the area of international trade its primary goal was to modify the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause underpinning the GATT by (partially) exempting developing countries from this obligation, while at the same time encouraging developed countries to discriminate in favor of imports from developing countries. A key principle was (and is)
the idea that such "special and differential treatment" be granted on the basis of "nonreciprocity", reflecting the premise that "treating unequals equally simply exacerbated inequalities" (UNCTAD, 2004) . Africa-are not due to OECD trade policies, but rather reflect domestic policies and institutions. Most would agree that the major constraint on export diversification and expansion in Africa is on the supply side.
Whatever the intended and actual impacts of trade preferences, they are a central issue in ongoing efforts to negotiate further multilateral trade liberalization. Middleincome countries are increasingly concerned about the discrimination they confront in OECD markets as a result of the better access granted in these mar kets to other industrialized countries-because of free trade agreements-and to poorer or "more preferred" developing countries. Conversely, preferences are used as an argument by the LDCs and African countries against a general liberalization of trade and removal of trade-distorting policies in agriculture. These countries worry about the potential negative effects of an erosion of their preferential access.
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In this paper, we explore the economic relevance of trade preferences in the context of WTO -based multilateral liberalization-the ongoing Doha Round of trade negotiations. This involves both an econometric assessment of the extent to which preference schemes are actually used (de facto as opposed to de jure preferences) as well as a numerical assessment of the dollar magnitude of potential preference erosion associated with further WTO-based, nondiscriminatory tariff reductions. In this analysis we assume that the principle of non-reciprocity continues to prevail-i.e., we model the effects of OECD liberalization while assuming that the developing countries benefiting from preferential access do not reduce their own protection. Many have argued that nonreciprocity has allowed many developing countries these countries to self-marginalize themselves in GATT/WTO negotiations, as they received market access benefits without having to actually engage in the process of negotiating concessions. Whatever one's views on this question, from the perspective of quantifying the magnitude of potential preference erosion non-reciprocity is an appropriate constraint to impose, as what matters is to assess the loss of benefits stemming from the removal of an explicit development-motivated policy that has been put in place by OECD countries. From this perspective it is not relevant that developing countries might benefit as well from their own liberalization or that of other developing countries, or that such potential benefits may be quite substantial.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We start in Section 2 with a brief review and summary of the major existing preference programs. In Section 3 we assess econometrically the magnitude of the preference margins that are implied by current programs, by estimating the threshold preference margin (the difference between MFN and preferential treatment) below which preference programs are irrelevant because of compliance costs (paperwork, red tape, documenting origin, etc.). This threshold is about 4 percent-implying that preferences can only matter for those products where the difference between MFN and preferential tariffs is higher than this-a relatively small 1 They are also concerned about the potential negative terms of trade effects of multilateral liberalization insofar as this raises the price of their imports, especially of goods that currently benefit from subsidies and protection in OECD markets, by more than the price/quantity of their exports. Both types of fears have been supported by many NGOs, who argue that LDCs have little to gain from the current round of multilateral trade negotiations, and may have more to lose. See Limão (2005) for a theoretical analysis of the incentives for a coalition of preference providers and recipients to seek to limit MFN reforms, and evidence for the EU and US that preferential trade arrangements do have a constraining impact on multilateral liberali zation.
set. In Section 4 we quantify an upper bound for the potential aggregate magnitude of erosion, assuming OECD members abolish all trade-distorting policies. As part of this analysis, we integrate the results of the analysis of compliance costs as identified in Section 3. We find that such costs imply that the potential benefits of trade preferences for developing countries are likely to be substantially offset, thus reducing the potential magnitude of preference erosion. Section 5 concludes.
Preferences in the GATT/WTO System
In 1971, a waiver to the most-favored -nation clause was approved by the contracting parties to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to permit GSP schemes. In 1979 they adopted the so -called 'Enabling Clause' in 1979, which established the legal framework for the GSP. Although Japan, Canada, Australia and several other countries implemented national GSP programs in favor of developing countr ies, the schemes of the EU and the US have been and continue to be the most important given the size of the two markets concerned.
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The first GSP preference scheme of the EU was implemented in 1971 for a tenyear period and has been renewed periodically. The scheme provides nonreciprocal preferences with lower tariffs or completely duty-free access for imports from 178 developing countries and territories into the EU market. GSP preferences are not part of contractual agreements with the recipient countries.
3 The general arrangements cover roughly 7,000 products, of which 3,250 are classified as non-sensitive and 3,750 are classified as sensitive products. The tariff preferences offered by the general arrangements differ according to the sensitivity of the products concerned: non-sensitive products enjoy duty free access to the EU market, while sensitive products benefit from a tariff reduction. These arrangements provide, as a rule, for a reduction of MFN ad valorem duties by a flat rate of 3.5 percentage points. These products comprise around 36% of tariff lines (EC Council Regulation No.2501 /01, 10 December 2001 . As sensitive products are generally the ones with high MFN rates, the proportionate impact of the preference can be rather small. An important exception to this rule of a flat rate reduction is granted to the textiles and clothing sectors which enjoy a percentage reduction of 20%. For specific duties a percentage reduction of 30% is the general rule.
Where duties include ad valorem and specific duties, only the ad valorem duties are reduced.
Country eligibility for the EU GSP program is determined on the basis of "indices" that combine the development and specialization level of the country:
where Y i (Y EU ) is the GDP per capita in the beneficiary country (EU) and X i (X EU ) is the manufactured exports of the beneficiary country (EU) to the EU (beneficiary country). The index increases in value as the beneficiary country becomes more developed and/or runs a surplus in manufactured goods trade with the EU. It has a value of zero, for example, if the beneficiary country has the same GDP per capita as the EU and has balanced trade. If the country has GDP per capita above $8,210 and the index has a value greater than -1, it is automatically removed from the GSP program. South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong, among others, were removed from the GSP program on the basis of these criteria.
A second graduation criterion is country/sector-specific and is based on the extent o f specialization: the relationship between the proportion of the imports in a given sector from a given country to the total EU imports in that sector and this country's share of total EU imports. A higher specialization index indicates that the county's exports to the EU are more concentrated in that category. As a result of this criterion, Brazil, India, China, Argentina and many other countries have lost eligibility for a wide range of product categories.
In 2001, the EU adopted new graduation criteria. All countries designated as high-income by the World Bank lose eligibility for all products automatically. A country can lose sectoral eligibility under two circumstances. First, the country in question has a development index I greater than -2 and it supplies more than 25% of EU total imports. Second, the country (i) has development index I larger than -2, (ii) has sectoral specialization index higher than a threshold level (depending on the actual development index) and (iii) it supplies more than 2% of EU total imports.
The EU GSP program has a safeguard clause that allows preferences to be suspended for certain products/countries if imports "cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties to a Community producer."
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The EU has also instituted "special incentive arrangements" that reward compliance with International Labor Organization Conventions, protection of environment and combating drug production and trafficking.
Countries that benefit from these special arrangements receive additional preferences on certain products in the sensitive list. Finally, human right violations, money laundering, corruption and violation of various international conventions on the environment may result in withdrawal of preferences.
A special arrangement under the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative, which is incorporated into the GSP preference scheme, is provided for the 49 UN-defined least developed countries (LDCs). The EBA scheme provides duty-free access for all products covered and originating in the beneficiary country, with the exception of imports of fresh bananas, rice, and sugar. and Lomé IV (1990 . Certain articles are prohibited from receiving GSP treatment. These include most textiles, watches, footwear, handbags, luggage and certain apparel.
One of the key features of the GSP program is that a country may lose eligibility for a specific product if its exports exceed a certain "competitive need limit," at the time of writing $110 million per tariff line. If the country in question has a market share larger than 50 percent of total US imports in that category, it may also lose the GSP eligibility.
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GSP eligibility can be removed at the country, product, or country-product level. The President has discretion over when and how to apply these criteria. In practice, an Assistant US Trade Representative chairs an interagency committee which makes eligibility and graduation decisions after reviewing petitions from interested parties (the country in question, import-competing domestic firms, labor unions, other firms, human rights/environmental NGOs, etc.). Hudec (1987) concludes that a consequence is that This summary overview indicates that (i) preference programs differentiate between developing countries and (ii) that there is significant "conditionality" associated with eligibility, including in non-trade areas and in terms of criteria that must be satisfied to benefit from preferential access. To assess the magnitude of potential preference erosion associated with further MFN liberalization these factors need to be taken into account.
Administrative Burden and the Utilization of Preferences
A key question when evaluating the benefits arising from trade preferences to the beneficiaries is the costs of obtaining the preferences. When traders request preferences they have to comply with administrative and technical requirements. The most important requirements are related to compliance with rules of origin. These define the conditions that a product must sati sfy to be originating from the exporting country that has been granted the preferential access. The main justification for rules of origin is to prevent trade deflection, whereby products from non-participating countries destined to the free trade area partner are redirected through the other free trade partners to avoid the payment of customs duties.
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When products are produced in a single stage then the origin of the products should be relatively easy to establish. For all other cases the rules of origin define the methods by which it can be determined that the product has been sufficiently processed in the free trade partner to qualify for preferential access. The specification of rules of origin has become especially important in recent years as technolo gical progress and globalization have led to the increasing fragmentation of the production process into different stages or tasks which are undertaken in different locations. Administration costs reduce effective preference margins. In order to assess to what extent preference schemes can deliver gains to the beneficiary countries in this section we examine the importance of the preference margin on the uptake of preferences.
In an early seminal paper, Herin (1986) argues that the costs of documentation and the administration of origin rules applied by the EEC imposed costs on exporters located in EFTA countries equivalent to some 3 percent of the value of the goods traded.
Carrère and de Melo (2004) provide non-parametric estimates for compliance costs of rules of origin based on the average rate of tariff preference for NAFTA members. The authors conclude that average total compliance costs for 2001 were 6.2%. When using double-censored tobit estimation techniques the authors obtain a compliance cost estimate of 3.9% for products where the utilization rate is below 100%.
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For developing countries these costs are expected to be even higher, due to information disadvantages, institutional weaknesses, etc.
The Estimating Framework
We use a threshold technique to estimate what is the minimum preference margin (difference between preferential and non-preferential tariff) needed under which traders have no incentive to ask for preferences because the costs of obtaining these exceeds their benefits. We limit the analysis to the preferential trade relations of non-least developed African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the EU under the Cotonou agreement. Nevertheless, this quantitative assessment can provide a more 10 See Brenton and Manchin (2003) ; more generally on rules of origin, see Hoekman (1993) . 11 See also Anson et al. (2004) .
general proxy for the costs traders fro m developing countries have to bear when requesting/obtaining preferential access.
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Since there may be other factors than preferential margin influencing the decision to ask for preferences we employ the technique recently developed by Hansen (2000) to endogenously determine any threshold in the relationship of interest, which allows one to control for such other factors. More specifically, this threshold estimation technique is ideal when data needs to be split into sub -samples in consideration of some relationship of interest. It takes the following form:
In equations (2) and (3), qi is the threshold variable and ? is the threshold parameter which splits the sample into two sub-samples. In our case qi is the difference between preferential and third country tariffs, and ? is the threshold value under which traders have no incentives to request preferences. The threshold parameter can be determined endogenously by allowing the continuously distributed qi to be an element of x i . This model allows the regression parameters to differ depending on the value of qi. The model can be re-written into a single equation:
In equation (4), ß=ß2 and
The first step is to identify the threshold value ? and the other coefficients. This is done by using the algorithm provided by Hansen (2000) , which searches through the values of ? until the splitting value is found (this is the value of ? which minimizes the concentrated sum of squared errors based on an OLS regression).
Most of the x i variables included in our threshold regression are typical variables used in gravity models-probably the most robust empirical relationship explaining the volume of bilateral trade flows. To identify the threshold value in the preferential margin we estimate to following equation: In equation (5), Y ijk is the utilization rate of Cotonou preferences for product k, in other words the percentage of country i's imports of product k from country j which requested preferential access. The data originates from Eurostat and contains import data at 8-digit level for the year 2001. Dutydifference k is the difference between MFN and preferential tariffs for product k. This is the variable (qi ) for which we identify a threshold value.
As a proxy for the trading countries' income and size the GDP (GDP i is the level of income in country i) and population (POP i is the population in country i) of both partner countries are included in the regression. GDP and population data are taken from the World Development Indicators database. D ij is the distance between the partner countries and is a proxy for trading costs. Previo us empirical results showed that distance had an important negative impact on trade. The further away the trading partners are located from each other the higher the costs will be for transporting the products.
Distance is expected to have a significant and negative impact on preferential trade. The distance data originates from the CEPII distance database and calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the capital cities.
To investigate the importance of the quality of economic environment in a given exporting ACP country an indicator of economic freedom was used (Freedomindex). Quota k is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the product was eligible for quota preferences and zero otherwise. The dummy for quota is included in the regression because it is likely that the circumstances for products entering under a preferential quota are different than for products entering without quota preferences; for example traders using the quota preferences are likely to be better informed. Furthermore, we include a dummy (called difference) for agricultural products for which the difference between preferential and MFN tariffs exceeds 30%. These agricultural products benefit from seasonal preferential duty reduction. Since we have yearly data it was not possible to exactly calculate the tariff reduction for these products, we calculated the yearly average tariffs, which might overestimate duty reductio n. Although these products only represent 0.8% of all observations, including a dummy for these products avoids that they inflate the threshold estimation. 
Estimation Results
In employing our threshold estimation, one cut-off value was identified. The 95% confidence interval for the threshold estimates indicates that the threshold obtained is between 48 and 52 percentiles. In terms of tariff difference, it is between 4 and 4.5%. Figure 2 plots the likelihood ratio sequence for percentiles in the sample ranked by tariff difference, and illustrates the clear break in the sample at this range of tariff differences.
Thus, the preferential tariff must be 4-4.5 percentage points lower than third country tariffs for traders to request preferences. This confidence interval is plausibly tight, since In order to verify that the threshold value i dentified is correct, a probit regression was undertaken using the identified threshold value. The existence of the threshold implies that the relationship between duty reduction and utilization rates is constant among sub -sets of products but varies between products. For products for which the duty reduction is small, the utilization rate might not be significantly influenced by the preferences offered, while higher duty reduction should significantly increase utilization rates. Thus if the threshold value is correct, the duty reduction under the threshold should not significantly influence utilization rate. (2) and (3) confirm the threshold value. The coefficient of the variable measuring duty reduction when it is below 4.5% (dutysmall) is negative and insignificant, while when the duty reduction is above the threshold (dutyhigh) it increases the probability of utilizing the preference scheme. These results confirm that the threshold value was correctly identified, in that there is a different relationship between tariff reduction above the threshold and the uptake of preferences.
What does this threshold imply for trade preferences? We will continue our focus on EU preferential trade as an example. It is therefore in manufacturing that we expect rules of origin, and related administration burdens, to be harder to overcome.
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From Table 4 , is it clear that on average, many EU tariffs in manufacturing are below the threshold we have identified. Yet at the same time, we can also see that there are peak rates that may still make utilization of preferences worthwhile. Hence, the pattern suggested in Table 4 will be a function of the underlying detailed composition of trade in specific products, and benefits will hinge on the margin of preference at the tariff-line level.
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The results presented in this section indicate that there exists a minimum preference margin needed for traders to request preferences. If the difference between preferential and third country tariff rates is less than a certain amount, there are no incentives for traders to request preferences, since the costs of obtaining the preferences are expected to be higher than the benefits from obtaining the preferences. We found this threshold for non-LDC ACP countries in their preferential trade with the EU to be between 4 -4.5%. Although this figure was found looking at a specific group of developing countries, it provides an approximation of trade costs implied by preferential schemes fo r other countries as well, as the requirements are similar.
The Scope for Preference Erosion
We next turn to a numerical assessment of preference erosion. Our goal here is to estimate the likely scope for any preference erosion if and when the OECD countries implement further multilateral tariff reductions. This involves the application of a global general equilibrium model, where preferences are included as part of the benchmark data, and where we gauge the impact of OECD tariff reductions on the preference-related gains from trade for the LDCs. We also integrate our assessment of the administration costs in the previous section, to identify how important this is for identifying the overall benefit of preferences, and hence for the impact of preference erosion.
17 See Stevens a nd Kennan (2004). Candau, Fontagné and Jean (2004) find that under-utilization of preferences is highest in textiles and garments (for EU imports under both the GSP and EBA programs). In the case of EBA, exporters in principle benefit from 100 percent duty-free access, but are found to pay up to 6.5 percent average tariffs.
The mechanics of erosion
To examine the basic mechanics of preferences, and preference erosion, we start with Preference erosion is a similar process, but one involving the elimination of tariffs on the non-preferential supplier. This is shown in Figure 4 . Elimination of the tariff on remaining third -country suppliers, given the duty free access already for preferential suppliers, means that third-country exporters see their exports increase from X non-LDC,1 to X non-LDC,2 . There is a gain in exporter surplus of area E, which may be greater or less than the original loss of exporter surplus resulting from the preferences, area B in 20 Only if the (more) preferred developing country (countries) is (are) small in the sense of not at all affecting the internal price in the importing nation will there be no detrimental effect on third country competitors. If so, the preference only creates trade (expands imports), to the detriment of local suppliers in the preference granting country, but not to other foreign suppliers, as they continue to confront the same price. See Baldwin and Murray (1977) for an early discussion. Most empirical studies conclude however that preference programs are associated with negative terms of trade effects for excluded (less preferred) countries, i.e., there is trade diversion as well as trade creation. Much depends on having good estimates of the elasticities of substitution between foreign and domestic goods and between foreign products of different origin. Early studies assumed these elasticities were identical. General equilibrium studies-including the one undertaken later in this paper-by contrast tend to use Armington elasticities. For more discussion, see Brown (1987) , Langhammer and Sapir (1987) and the references cited there. . This results in a partial, though generally not full, loss of the benefits from the original preference scheme. This is represented by area C, which is shown as being less than area A in Figure 3 . The reason the loss is not complete is that preferences include, in part, the benefits relative to the original tariff-ridden equilibrium from a nondiscriminatory tariff reduction by the importer. We therefore have preference erosion generally yielding a partial, though not full, loss of the original benefits of the preference scheme. At the same time, third-countries recover some of the costs originally imposed by the preference scheme.
We should add a few caveats to the discussion at his stage. First, to the extent there is market power on the part of either importers (Francois and Wooton 2005) or the transport and logistics sector (Francois and Wooton 2001) , we can expect the benefits of tariff reductions to be captured, at least in part, by those intermediaries with market power rather than the exporters themselves. There is evidence, based on the AGOA preference scheme, that the pass through of preference margins is indeed partial at best. Olarreaga and Özden (2005) find that the average export price increase for products benef iting from preferences under AGOA was about 6 percent, whereas the average MFN tariff for these products was some 20 percent. Thus, on average exporters received around one-third of the tariff rent. Moreover, poorer and smaller countries tended to obtain l ower shares-with estimates ranging from a low of 13 percent in Malawi to a high of 53 percent in Mauritius.
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In addition, based on our analysis in the previous section, we should expect administration costs related to these programs to also chew up some of the benefits. In the case of market power, the result is a simple redistribution of the benefits of preferences (rents) being transferred to importers. With administration costs, however, the share of the gains that is lost is not redistributed, but is really a deadweight loss. In both cases, the trade effects of preference programs will be less as well.
A numerical assessment
We now turn to a numerical assessment of the likely magnitudes involved. While there has been a great deal of political weight attached to this issue, this debate has largely been taking place in a vacuum of real information on the costs and benefits involved.
Moreover, the exceptions have focused almost exclusively on the effects of preference erosion on the exports of beneficiary countries.
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Our assessment uses a global, multiregion general equilibrium model of trade. The model includes 34 regions/countries and 24 sectors (Table 5 ). The social accounting data come from the GTAP database (http://www.gtap.org) and are benchmarked to 2001. These data include national production and international trade flows.
The import protection data are based on a thorough and careful effort to include use of preferences in a matrix of global import protection (Bouet et al. 2004) . These data 
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Factor supplies are fixed nationally, and are allocated between sectors through factor markets.
The experiment itself is relatively straightforward. We eliminate, on a multilateral basis, all OECD import tariffs on all goods. This includes the ad -valorem equivalents (AVEs) of specific tariffs and tariff-rate quotas, and takes into account the prevailing preference programs as reported in CEPII. We also conduct a sub-experiment, where we eliminate these tariffs first for the EU alone. This gives us a chance to identify the full magnitude of preference erosion for a sample of least developed and low -income countries (conceptually represented by area C in Figure 3) , and also to identify the share of these effects that are due to EU preferences. Finally, we then re-calculate our estimate of EU preference erosion after adjusting for the administrative cost threshold of 4 percent identified in the previous section. This has a substantial impact on the estimated scope for preference erosion.
Our estimates of the dollar impact of full preference erosion on real national income are shown in Table 6 . We have included the impact on the LDCs in Sub -Saharan Africa, as well as other low -income countries in our sample (using the World Bank classification of countries by income). The tables reveal that EU preferences are very important, as a bilateral measure, for Sub -Saharan African countries. Given the current trade policy landscape, we estimate EU preferences to be potentially worth some $460 million annually to African LDCs. Asian countries benefit less, with the exception of Bangladesh ($100 million). These are therefore countries that stand to lose-all other things equal-from a move by the EU to lower MFN trade protection. Other developing country groups stand to gain-these are the "less preferred" in the overall hierarchy of preferences.
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Although we are not convinced that the potential preference rents all actually accrue to the exporting countries (again, see Olarreaga and Özden 2005) , our estimates provide a measure of what is at stake.
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Our welfare estimates cannot be compared directly to the results obtained in recent partial equilibrium -based analyses such as IMF (2003) and Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) as these focus solely on trade effects. The IMF estimates the potential export revenue lo ss from preference erosion resulting from a 40 percent cut in protection by 23 See Francois and Roland-Holst (1997) for details. The model is documented in Anderson, Francois, and Hoekman (forthcoming) and is available for download at http://www.intereconomics.com/francois. 24 The income effects are mirrored in the trade effects in Table 4 , which reveals that export reductions map to income reductions. This is fully consistent with our earlier discussion centered on Figures 2 and 3 . 25 As discussed further in the concluding section a case can be made that even if exporters do not get the rents they should get them. In any discussion that focuses on offsetting the loss from preference erosion one can argue that account should be taken of any "missing" rents.
Canada, the EU, Japan and the US at some $530 million. This assumes full utilization of preferences and that developing countries get all of the associated rents. Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) , focusing on middle-income countries only, conclude that potential erosion impacts are less than 2 percent of total exports for the countries that are most "preference dependent". Limão and Olarreaga (2005) are to our knowledge the only paper to undertake an analysis of the welfare effects of complete preference erosion. They calculate what the income transfer to LDCs would need to be that would be equivalent in to the transfer implied by existing preference programs. They conclude that for LDCs the figure is $266
million. This is a one-year, short-run effect-all else equal the net present value is argued to be several times higher. Their results are in line with ours, assuming away the compliance costs associated with preference programs (which they do).
If we view the issue of preference erosion in the broader context of potential tariff reduction by all OECD countries, not just EU members, the magnitude of the total losses is reduced. In part this is because the EU has been the most aggressive in using preferences as a tool for development assistance-such programs in other OECD countries have tended to be subject to greater exceptions (an example has been the noninclusion of apparel in US GSP programs). Thus, the gains associated with non-EU MFN tariff reductions will partially offset losses due to EU liberalization. In the case of Sub -Saharan Africa our estimates suggest that overall losses will be reduced by a factor of four-to $110 million. In addition, low -income countries in Asia stand to gain a lot from other OECD tariff reductions.
What are the implications of taking into account our threshold estimates of compliance costs? In Table 7 we report a second set of estimates for preference erosion tied to EU preferences. Recall from Table 6 that the EU preferences are the dominant issue at play. The estimates in Table 7 are based on our earlier estimate of the compliance cost for EU trade preferences being some 4% of the value of the goods exported. We eliminate these costs as part of the experiment in Table 7 . In other words, we assume that with zero tariffs, the need to enforce rules of origin becomes moot. Moreover, we make this adjustment for goods that (1) are classified as manufactured goods (reflecting the observation in the literature that utilization rates are high for non-manufactures in the case of African exports), and (2) offer a potential preference margin of at least 4 percentage points (Table 4) . Another way to view this is that we adjust downward the potential benefit of preferences by the value of the margin, up to 4 percent points of the total value of a tariff concession.
We find that the magnitude of preference erosion changes somewhat overall, with the change varying across countries. For Bangladesh, which is specialized in high tariff categories like clothing that are subject to restrictive rules of origin, the magnitude of potential erosion is cut by half. For Madagascar, potential losses turn into potential gains. The reason for these results is that the compliance costs associated with implementing preference programs biases upward estimates of the value of preferences.
For countries specialized in agriculture -Malawi and Zambia for example -the effects of accounting for compliance costs are much smaller due to our assumption-based on other studies (Stevens and Kennan, 2004; Candau et al. 2004 )-that compliance costs are not a big issue.
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Overall, allowing for rules compliance costs, we no longer have any real losses for African LDCs in total, though we do for individual countries. What this says then is that on net, EU preferences do not really offer benefits to African LDCs. To the extent individual countries benefit, blocking multilateral reductions to maintain these benefits really involves hurting some (neighboring) countries, with no real net benefits for the region as a whole. It also points to the need for country-by-country analysis and assessments of the potential impacts of preference erosion.
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The results from Tables 6 and 7 imply that the magnitude of any transfer needed to offset (or compensate for) the effect of erosion is much smaller in a context where all OECD countries liberalize than in a bilateral EU context. LDCs do stand to lose from tariff reductions in sectors or products where preferences matter. However, they also stand to benefit from improved access to OECD markets; a process that at least partially, and often substantially, offsets the more direct losses on a bilateral basis from erosion of preference margins. We should note that this offset is most likely to be an underestimate, because of the assumption that developing countries themselves do not liberalize.
Independent of the welfare economic implications of this assumption, as noted previously, it is an appropriate constraint to impose given the political economy-cum- 26 We can note in passing that this implies that the compliance cost estimate obtained in Section 3 will in fact be higher than 4 percent on average for manufactures. This also biases upward our calculation of the potential value of erosion. 27 IMF (20003) concludes that individual LDCs may suffer more than average due the concentration of their exports in products that enjoy deep preferences. Of the LDCs, Cape Verde, Haiti, Malawi, Mauritania, and São Tomé and Príncipe are found to be the most vulnerable to preference erosion. Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) conclude that six middle -income countries -Belize, Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia-would also be significantly affected, with predicted export declines ranging from 11.5 percent for Mauritius to 7.8 percent for Fiji.
negotiating context in which the preference erosion question is placed. The issue at hand is the magnitude of erosion of benefits that stem from removal of an explicit development-motivated policy that has been put in place by O ECD countries. From this perspective it is not relevant that there are other sources of offsetting market access and/or terms of trade gains-be it from liberalization by other developing countries or own liberalization.
Finally, it is informative to place our estimates in the context of ongoing changes in the trading system. Table 8 suppliers, incentives were created for importers to source from other developing countries. As can be seen in Table 8 , for sub-Saharan Africa the negative effects of the ATC are significant, although they are smaller than for Asian countries such as India and
Vietnam. These losses reflect a combination of greater competition from China and loss of quota rents.
For Africa, the ATC-induced negative impact is smaller than our estimates of the potential magnitude of Doha Round preference erosion if no account is taken of compliance costs. However, if account is taken of compliance costs, the potential trade preference losses are a less important issue than those associated with lifting of ATC textile and clothing quotas.
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From a practical perspective this conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the ATC effect is "here and now," whereas additional Doha Round -based erosion will only occur in the future and thus needs to be discounted appropriately.
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As other recent studies of this issue (like the IMF 2003) focus on trade effects, in Table 9 we report on export effects. These map to the income effects reported in Table   8 . Again, for some countries, like Botswana, Mozambique, and Madagascar, there is a 28 Note that strictly speaking this comparison cannot be made as the textiles and clothing erosion estimates assume zero compliance costs. However, as the ATC was based on quotas with associated rents that were equivalent to tariffs well above our threshold value of compliance costs, overall such costs are not likely to have had major effects in relative terms. 29 As mentioned previously, the ATC effects noted here have been incorporated into the baseline scenario, i.e., it is assumed that the associated effects have already played themselves out.
significant drop in exports with full preference erosion. However, these preferencebased export gains are, in a sense, at the expense of other countries in the region.
Overall, it is clear the region would benefit overall from MFN -based tariff reductions by the OECD, despite the erosion of preferences.
Concluding Remarks
Because of concern that OECD tariff reductions will translate into worsening export performance for the LDCs, trade preferences may be a stumbling block to obtaining broad -based support for deep liberalization by OECD countries in the Doha Round. In this paper we have examined the magnitude of potential preference erosion, based on an econometric assessment of the actual utilization of preferences, and the scope for erosion estimated by modeling full elimination of OECD tariffs and hence full erosion.
We find strong evidence that preferences are underutilized due to administrative burdens.
This presumably reflects rules of origin and similar hurdles placed in the way of actually utilizing trade preferences. The implication is that the actual value of preferences is reduced quite substantially. In addition, in US dollar terms we find that the primary negative impact of erosion follows from the removal of EU trade barriers. This suggests that the erosion problem is primarily a bilateral, not a WTO-based concern. Indeed, multilateral liberalization by all OECD countries can serve to substantially reduce the aggregate amount of erosion losses.
What are the policy implications of our analysis? Preferences can only have an impact if there is a non-zero tariff in the importing market. Two-thirds of the major items Africa exports to Canada, for example, face zero MFN tariffs; and 69% of EU imports from Africa (by value) in 2000 were in items facing zero MFN duties (Stevens and Kennan, 2004) . Raising trade barriers in order to increase the value of preferential access would be globally welfare reducing, although it is sometimes suggested. More common is the argument used by vested interests in the OECD that preferred developing countries should not lose any more preferential access to their (highly distorted) markets. The result is the potential for status quo bias reflecting a "bootleggerBaptist" coalition between protectionist interests and development NGOs in the North and developing country governments in the South. This would impose a significant opportunity cost from a global efficiency perspective.
One solution would be to agree to compensate developing countries for preference erosion (Page, 2004) . Given the systemic downsides, limited benefits, and historical inability of many poor countries in Africa and elsewhere to use preferences, a decision to shift away from preferential "trade as aid" toward more efficient and effective instruments to support poor countries could both improve development outcomes and help strengthen the multilateral trad ing system (Hoekman, 2004) . More effective integration of the poorest countries into the trading system requires instruments aimed at improving the productivity and competitiveness of firms and farmers in these countries.
Supply constraints are the primary factors that have constrained the ability of many African countries to benefit from preferences.
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This suggests that the main need is to improve trade capacity and facilitate diversification. In part this can be pursued through a shift to more (and more effective) development assistance that targets domestic supply constraints as well as measures to reduce the costs of entering foreign markets.
The additional transfers associated with a decision to compensate countries for lost preferences are not large r elative to existing aggregate official development assistance-currently in the $65 billion range. As noted the issue is to a large extent a bilateral one, in that most of the prospective loss is generated by MFN liberalization by the EU. We would argue that the amount needed should be based on our bilateral analysis, as that generates the best measure of the value attached to the preference program. That is, even though compliance costs are very important determinants of the value of preferences, from a compensation perspective they should be ignored -after all, they imply that recipients are less able to use the programs.
30 Page (2004) , Stevens and Kennan (2004) . Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
